

NSA, DIA and OSD review(s) completed.

~~SECRET~~

NGA Review Completed.

12 March 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with the Secretary of Defense, 11 March 1980

1. We disposed of the NIE 11-3/8 problem very quickly. I told the Secretary we were taking ^{over} the US No SALT projections and all [] material. 25X1A
 He said to me then, "It will be just like last year." I said yes, it will be just like last year, updated. He said that was fine with him. The Secretary incidentally said that he had no objection to our doing net assessments. He just didn't want them in NIE's because of the stature they had. In talking with General Smith also, I detected the line of argumentation against continuing even our quasi-dynamic analyses will be that the NIE has such stature and these are so subject to misinterpretation that we shouldn't risk that. [] 25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

OSD
REVIEW
COMPLETE
D

He wanted to make sure we were having adequate exchange of information about Congressional reactions to [] hearings and to NFIP hearings. I told him I assumed that was taking place. I would appreciate reassurance. []

25X6

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

5X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1D

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

8. He asked about the biological warfare accident that the Soviets had about a year ago [Redacted] He wondered if we had tried to validate that report. [Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

SECRET

25X1D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1C

[Redacted]

12. I asked him if he had any suggestions on the PDB and mentioned the President's request for changes. He said he thought a lot of our problem was that it sounded in recent months more as though we were

[Redacted]

25X1

His one suggestion would be that perhaps we should get somebody from INR to join the PDB Staff and help make sure

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1C

13. [Redacted]

25X1

14. [Redacted]

25X1C

25X1C

[Redacted]

25X1

[Redacted]

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

25X1

[Redacted]

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

25X1

General Items

25X1A

- Iran [redacted]

25X1A

[redacted]

(DoD paper to be presented on Friday)

↳ we have not revel.

- Camp David
- Soviet BW accident

see attached at left for related mat. ←

- At last meeting Brown asked if we had tried to validate a DIA report

[redacted]

ILLEGIB

25X1A

[redacted]

- Brown asked about this last time and you were uncertain as to where things stood
- LA Division has been in touch with his (Murphy's) people and I believe things are on track (DDCI will be having a meeting Thursday afternoon to review where we stand on this)

↳ we will be submitting a regional approach for 7 Apr SCC(E) (hope for DoD support)



[redacted]

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300090002-9

Next 8 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP81B00401R002300090002-9

~~SECRET~~

NFAC #2031/80

THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

20 MAR 1980

NOTE FOR THE DIRECTOR

91
25 MAR 1980

Per your request for information about the number of Soviet tanks in Afghanistan and the number and kinds of tanks used by the Afghan Army, I am forwarding the attached memo which was prepared by the Afghan Task Force and OSR. I am also sending you a description of the capabilities of the Soviet MI-24 helicopter which is being used by Soviet forces in Afghanistan

Since Secretary Brown requested the information about the helicopter you might want to send him a copy of the memo or deliver it personally to him when you see him next week.

Bruce C. Clarke, Jr. 25X1

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Harold:

At your request I am sending you our assessment of the capabilities of the Soviet MI-24 helicopter which are currently being used by the Soviets in Afghanistan. I am also including information about the number and types of tanks being used by the Afghan Army as well as the number and types of tanks the Soviets are using in Afghanistan.


Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon


25X1

SECRET



25X1

25X6



18 March 1980

MEMORANDUM


SUBJECT: Response to DCI Questions on Afghan and Soviet Tanks and Soviet Helicopters in Afghanistan

1. The Afghan Army has received as many as 600 tanks from the USSR over the years, and some 300 of these are still operational. The Afghan tanks include mostly older models such as the T-34, T-54, and T-55, but the Afghans also have some of the newer T-62s. The tanks are scattered throughout the country with most of the T-62s in the Kabul area.

25X6

2. The Soviet motorized rifle divisions and regiments in Afghanistan brought with them their T-54s, T-55s, and T-62s and now have more than 700 tanks in-country. We have no evidence that the Soviets have moved either the T-64 or the T-72 tank into Afghanistan.

25X6
25X6




4. The Soviets have introduced their MI-24 (HIND) attack helicopters into Afghanistan. The MI-24 can carry a variety of antitank guided missiles, bombs, and rockets. The HIND D is armed with the AT-2 ATGM while the HIND E carries the AT-6 ATGM. We have not yet seen any HIND Es in Afghanistan. Both missiles

25X6
25X6



5. The enclosures describe the capabilities of the MI-24 helicopter.

25X6



25X6

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

SECRET

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

NFAC-2290-80

Executive Registry
80-845

Dear Harold:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the Afghanistan intelligence priorities in the Department of Defense. Not surprisingly, your list of specific concerns closely matches the thrust of our intelligence collection and production effort. Attached is a description of NFAC and interagency intelligence production. It includes both items that we have already produced and a brief description of those in progress.

I agree that a concentrated analytical attack on all facets of the Soviet incursion offers a rare opportunity to test hypotheses and otherwise generally improve our understanding of their military capabilities viewed in the broadest sense. Both collection and production efforts in CIA are being made to take maximum advantage of the situation. For example, we are now forming a multidisciplinary analytical group in the National Foreign Assessment Center to concentrate on Southwest Asia and Iran. This group will include political, military, and economic analysts with regional expertise on the Soviet Union and countries in Southwest Asia; it will be producing intelligence on most

25X1



Yours,

STANSFIELD TURNER

NOTE
DCI did not sign
but handed attachment
to SecDef at their
3/27/80 meeting.

The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon

Attachments
As stated

M/ER
4/1/80

25X1



SECRET

Next 10 Page(s) In Document Exempt